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Abstract 
Tax literature acknowledges that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as grassroots dimensions of the 
“slippery  slope  framework”,  influence  compliance  behavior.  The  present  material  assesses  the  framework’s  main 
dimensions in the case of the Mediterranean tax climate (i.e., Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) by a manifold of 
economic, financial and psychological variables. The proposed rationale, including World Bank governance indicators 
(government  effectiveness,  rule  of  law,  regulatory  quality,  control  for  corruption)  as  proxies  for  the  framework’s 
dimensions, analyses of chain base indexes with respect to economic performance (calculations involving GDP per capita), 
quantitative evaluation of tax compliance burden and cost of taxation (calculations involving Paying Taxes reports), aims 
at raising awareness among policy makers and citizens about relevance of trust and power for compliance behavior within 
the Mediterranean tax climate. Multidisciplinary estimations of trust and power may constitute a benchmark for decision 
makers in appraising the effects generated by the measures countervailing crises and in designing strategies to hinder 
future undesirable economic bouts.          
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1. Introduction   
 
In Mandarin Chinese the word “crisis” (wēijī) is expressed by two characters, wēi meaning “danger” and jī defining “a 
beginning  or  turning  point”,  in  this  particular  context  [35].  History  repeatedly  shows  that  turning  points,  if  astutely 
managed, can engender opportunities. For that matter, during a 1959 speech delivered in Indianapolis, the 35
th US president 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy advised that “in a crisis, be aware of the danger  – but recognize the opportunity” (Goldsmith, 
Baldoni and McArthur, 2010:  1) [5].      
The legacy received by the 21
st century from the previous age amasses a plethora of economic, political, social crises, 
clashes  and  turning  points  which  shaped  nowadays  global  market.  Understanding and reducing such clashes may be 
achieved by thoroughly assessing different economic (e.g., inflation rate, national debts, unemployment rate), psychological 
(e.g.,  attitudes,  beliefs,  perceptions),  political  (e.g.,  democracy,  government  stability,  policy  volatility)  or  social  (e.g., 
norms, regulations, mores, values) constructs, two of which being trust in authorities and power of authorities.  
In  the  field  of  tax  compliance,  the  two  constructs  are  examined concerning their influence on taxpayers‟ behavior 
unfolded  during  interactions  with  tax  authorities,  which  are  assumed  to  vary  between  synergism  and  antagonism. 
Consequently, such behavior may emerge under various patterns ranging from abiding the letter and the spirit of the law to 
breaking  legal  precepts  (James  and  Alley,  2002)  [9].  Noncompliance  can  take  either the form of tax avoidance and tax 
evasion, if stipulated so by the legislator. When taxpayers manage to avoid fiscal obligations customarily with professional 
assistance, they act within the boundaries of the law, but against its spirit as they take advantage of existing loopholes 
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(Sandmo,  2003;  Webley,  2004)  [20]-[25].  When  fiscal  obligations  are  evaded  through  acts  of  omission  or  commission 
(Kirchler,  2007)  [14],  taxpayers willingly  manifest their opposition about the letter and the spirit of the tax law.        
According  to  the  literature,  trust  in  authorities  and  power  of  authorities  are  regarded  as  main  dimensions  of the 
“slippery  slope  framework”,  which  endeavors  to  explain  tax  compliance  by incorporating  economic  and psychological 
stances  (Kirchler,  Hoelzl  and  Wahl,  2008:  212)  [15].  The  former  dimension  denotes  taxpayers‟  perceptions  regarding 
authorities‟  benevolence and beneficial actions serving the common good. The latter designates taxpayers‟ perceptions 
regarding authorities‟ capableness to discover and sanction tax evaders. The framework stipulates that compliance can be 
fostered by enhancing trust and power. Voluntary compliance prevails when trust in authorities is increased, while enforced 
compliance  predominates  when  power  of  authorities  is  heightened.  It  also  implies  that  authorities‟  approach  towards 
taxpayers influences compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008: 220) [15]: a “cops and robbers” attitude displayed in antagonistic 
interactions crowds out voluntary compliance, while a “service and client” attitude fostered within synergistic interactions 
boosts  cooperation  with  authorities.  Tax  behavior  literature  documents  the significant influence of the aforementioned 
dimensions on tax compliance through various empirical investigations often involving self-employed and student samples 
(Kasper,  Kogler  and  Kirchler,  2013;  Kogler  et  al.,  2013;  Kogler,  Muehlbacher  and  Kirchler,  2013;  Lisi,  2012; 
Muehlbacher, Kirchler  and Schwarzenberger, 2011; Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler,  2010)  [10]-[16]-[17]-[18]-[19]-[24].   
The  present  material illustrates the framework‟s chief dimensions in the case of Mediterranean tax climate (Cyprus, 
Greece,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain)  by  means  of  different  economic,  financial  and  psychological  variables.  The  proposed 
approach,  comprising World Bank governance indicators (i.e., government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, 
control for corruption) as proxies for trust in authorities and power of authorities, analyses of chain base indexes concerning 
economic performance (based on calculations involving GDP per capita), quantitative evaluation of tax compliance burden 
and cost of taxation (based on calculations involving Paying Taxes reports), aims at raising awareness among decision 
makers and general public about relevance of trust and power for compliance behavior in the Mediterranean tax climate. 
Multidisciplinary estimations of trust and power may constitute a benchmark for policy makers in appraising the effects 
generated by the measures countervailing crises and in designing strategies to prevent other future undesirable economic 
bouts.        
The reminder of the paper is the following. Section 2 entails a rundown  on the chief features of Mediterranean tax 
systems  from  Cyprus,  Greece,  Italy,  Spain  and Portugal. Section 3 discusses the role trust in authorities and power of 
authorities play in shaping the Mediterranean tax climate.  Section 4 sums up the concluding remarks.    
 
2. Rundown  on Mediterranean Tax Systems 
 
Following the 2008 financial meltdown and the subsequent EMU sovereign-debt crisis, the question of the welfare 
states has emerged amidst governments‟ attempts to identify the most effective measures of capping staggering levels of 
budget deficits. Economic literature aggregates a plethora of studies recounting various welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 
1990;  Hemerijck,  2013;  Hemerijck  et  al.,  2013;  Kettunen and Petersen, 2011; Starke, Kaasch and van Hooren, 2013; van 
Kersbergen,  2012)  [4]-[6]-[7]-[12]-[22]-[23],  among  which  the  most  common  models  are:  Nordic  (Social  Democratic), 
Continental (Conservative), Mediterranean, Anglo-Saxon (Liberal)  and East European.  
  Numbering  Cyprus,  Greece,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Spain  (all  OECD  members, except for the first), the Mediterranean 
welfare state generally ranks below the first two models in terms of fiscal pressure, income equality or poverty reduction. 
Its underpinning features include: progressive taxation and high fiscal burden, especially through labor and indirect taxes; 
the  most  generous social security systems, with high expenditure levels (e.g., granting various unemployment benefits, 
nevertheless favoring “benefit fraud”); high levels of poverty and income inequality; lowest expenditures on education, 
active  labor  market  policies,  early  childhood  development  (Hemerijck  et  al.,  2013)  [7];  high  levels  of  tax  evasion, 
corruption and underground economy.    
  Quite obviously, despite the fact that Mediterranean tax authorities manage to offer high quality public goods, their 
main  challenge  is  to  uphold  substantial  public  expenditures  accumulated  especially  in  the  last  years  which  led  to 
unprecedented debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2012, according to OECD, Italy registered 142.2%, Greece 167.3%, Portugal 134.5% 
and  Spain  92.8%  debt-to-GDP.  Other  challenges  target  mitigating  tax  evasion,  shadow  economy  (see  section  3)  or 
increasing tax morale. 
  Because  our  approach  is  mainly  based  on  a  multidisciplinary  evaluation  of  the  two  psychological  dimensions 
characterizing tax climates, i.e., trust in and power of authorities, and on the manner they influence compliance behavior, in 
the following we refer to the five-country cluster as Mediterranean tax climate.    
  In order to have an appraisal for the evolution of economic growth within the Mediterranean tax climate, based on 
data  provided  by  the  World  Bank  regarding  the  decade  2003-2012,  we  computed  the  average  GDP  per  capita for the 
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Mediterranean tax climate and highlighted it, along with the average GDP per capita for the EU and the world GDP per 
capita (figure 1). A positive evolution of all three indicators can be noticed across the decade. Moreover, the Mediterranean 
average GDP  per capita attains scores comparable with the EU ones both in terms of absolute value and ascending trend.  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The evolution  of Mediterranean  GDP per capita  with  respect to  
EU  and  World GDP  per capita  values,  2003-2012 (Current $US) 
Source: Authors‟ computation based on World Bank Data (2003-2012). 
 
The aforementioned conclusions are backed by the results of the chain base indexes analysis determined for the three 
indicators and presented in Table 1. The dynamics of the growth rates reveals a positive trend for all three indicators until 
year 2008 and relatively close values. Starting with 2009/2008, on the account of severe recession caused by the world 
economic downturn, the analysis points out a slow decrease of the indicators, especially for the Mediterranean and EU 
average GDP  per capita, a revival in 2011/2010  and anew mitigation in 2012/2011. 
       
Table  1. Chain base indexes of Mediterranean  (M),  EU  and  World  (W) GDP  per capita,  2003-2012  
  2004/2003  2005/2004  2006/2005  2007/2006  2008/2007  2009/2008  2010/2009  2011/2010  2012/2011 
M  16.29%  6.67%  8.04%  15.76%  13.31%  -9.97%  -1.65%  6.86%  -7.10% 
EU  14.95%  4.10%  6.20%  15.11%  7.12%  -11%  -1.24%  8.58%  -5.87% 
W  11.16%  6.88%  7.01%  11.26%  8.38%  -6.33%   7.87%  9.60%   0.78% 
Source: Authors‟ computation based on World Bank Data (2003-2012) 
 
The specificity of the interaction between authorities and taxpayers in the Mediterranean tax climate can be reflected 
by the Paying Taxes reports. These reports comprise three indicators determined for small and medium enterprises: number 
of  tax  payments  (NP),  number  of  hours  to  comply  with  the  main  taxes,  viz.  profit  taxes,  labor  taxes  and  mandatory 
contributions, consumption taxes (NH) and total tax rate (TTR). The first two indicators are incorporated into what is called 
tax  compliance  burden,  while  the  third  is  known  as the cost of all taxes borne by  this type of entity. Thus, based on 
information captured in eight Paying Taxes reports issued by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the World Bank between 2006 
and  2013,  we  calculated  averages  for  all  three  indicators  regarding  the  Mediterranean  tax  climate  and  plotted  them 
alongside world averages in the following figures.  
Overall, across the analyzed period, both compliance burden and cost of taxation have registered a downfall, due to 
most governments‟ efforts of collecting enough revenues for public budget, while making their economic environment still 
attractive for foreign investors. Mediterranean countries follow the general trend and, in addition, they perform better than 
the world average in terms of NP, NH and, in the last years, in terms of TTR.   
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Figure 2. Averages for Mediterranean  Tax  Climate and  World Number  of Tax Payments,   
spanning 2005-2012 
Source: Authors‟ computation based on Paying Taxes reports released between 2006-2013. 
 
While all five Mediterranean countries have kept their NP constant, Greece sets the lessening pace by reducing its NP 
from 33 in 2005 to 8 in 2012. This result is due to the harsh mitigation of labor taxes and mandatory contributions from 12 
(in  2005)  to 1 (in 2012) enacted by the Greek authorities. Apart from this mitigation, the Mediterranean countries along 
with the other EU states have the lowest NP after North American ones (The World Bank & PwC,  2013)  [26]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Averages for Mediterranean  Tax  Climate and  World Number  of Hours to Comply,   
spanning 2005-2012 
Source: Authors‟ computation based on Paying Taxes Reports released between 2006-2013. 
 
The Mediterranean countries together with the rest of the EU members not only have the lowest time to comply after 
the Middle East states, but also they have registered a decrease over time. The most striking abatement belongs to Spain, 
which  has  lowered  the  total  NH  from  602  in  2005  to  167  in  2012,  especially  with  regards  to  consumption  taxes.  The 
decrease is an effect of introducing tax electronic filing and payment systems, as well as of implementing other reforms to 
simplify  compliance procedures (The World Bank & PwC, 2013)  [26]. 
Labor  taxes  and  mandatory  contributions are the most substantial component of TTR at the world wide scale and 
particularly in the Mediterranean tax climate. Concerning the general trend during the analyzed period, facing severe crisis 
conditions, Mediterranean countries have opted to diminish the profit tax rates for small and medium enterprises (especially 
Greece and Italy) in order to fuel the economy, while increasing indirect taxation. For instance, from September 1, 2012, 
Spain  increased  both  the standard VAT from 18% to 21% and the reduced VAT from 8% to 10% (The World Bank & 
PwC, 2013) [26] at the expense of abating domestic consumption. In 2012, one can notice the increase of the Mediterranean 
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TTR above the world average, as a consequence of Spain government‟s measures to raise tax effort (from 38.7% in 2010 
and 2011 to 58.6% in 2012) in order to cut its public deficit. The measures had an immediate echo, as the public deficit 
declined from 8.96%  in 2011  to 6.98%  in 2012  (The World Bank & PwC, 2013)  [26].   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Averages for Mediterranean  Tax  Climate and  World Total  Tax  Rate,  
spanning 2005-2012 
Source: Authors‟ computation based on Paying Taxes Reports released between 2006-2013. 
 
All  in  all,  though  the  Mediterranean  tax  climate  still  faces  multiple  vulnerabilities  concerning  administrative  and 
regulating  policies,  the  evolution  of  the  indicators  could  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  tax  authorities‟  struggle  to ease 
compliance  for  citizens  and  foreign  investors.  The  improvement  registered  so  far  along  with  expected  measures  of 
simplifying  tax  systems  will  increase  the  general  level  of  tax  compliance,  crowd out tax evasion incentives and finally 
impact on the perceived levels of trust in and power of authorities.   
 
3. The Role Trust in and Power of Authorities Have in Shaping the Mediterranean Tax Climate  
 
Throughout this section, we will explore the two main dimensions of the “slippery slope framework” which shape the 
Mediterranean tax climate following the approach proposed by Batrancea and Nichita (2014) [1]. Trust in authorities and 
power of authorities can be rated with the help of four World Governance Indicators proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi  (2010)  [11]  and  released  annually  by  the  World  Bank for more than 200 worldwide countries and territories: 
Regulatory  Quality  (RQ),  Government  Effectiveness  (GE),  Control  for  Corruption  (CC),  Rule  of  Law  (RL).  RQ  targets 
citizens‟ views about the capability of authorities to boost growth in the private sector via efficient policies. As stated by its 
name,  GE  comprises  citizens‟  perceptions  about  the  quality  of  public  goods  and  civil  service,  design,  wording  and 
implementation  of  strategies,  and  the  reliability  of  the  government  committed  to  implement  particular  strategies.  CC 
defines both the extent to which personal benefits are secured through public power (e.g., via petty and grand corruption) 
and  the  extent  to  which  elites  and  private  interests  subdue  public power. Last but not least, RL captures perceptions 
concerning the degree in which citizens abide by the laws, namely aspects of contract enforcement, property rights, police 
and courts, prospects of crime and violence.  
The trust in authorities dimension, which fuels voluntary tax compliance, is best captured by the indicators RQ and GE. 
The  rationale  is  somewhat  straightforward.  Namely, countries where decision makers enjoy high levels of trust usually 
boast prosperous economies, prompt governing policies, substantial tax compliance levels and reduced tendency of dodging 
taxes.  In  such  countries,  governments  are  frequently  committed  to  building  strong  rapports  with  taxpayers  and  to 
implementing  solid strategies, which ultimately ensure access to high quality public goods. 
The  power  of  authorities  dimension,  playing  a  key  role  in  heightening  enforced  tax  compliance  according  to  the 
“slippery  slope  framework”,  relates  to  a  great  extent  with  the  indicators  CC  and  RL.  Countries  where  authorities  are 
regarded as fully capable of enforcing legal provisions, without subduing power to their personal benefits, register lower 
levels  of  corruption  and  shadow  economy.  Furthermore, decision-makers‟ commitment to deterring and sanctioning tax 
evaders is mirrored by citizens‟ following the tax law to a large degree. In such countries, noncompliance is deemed as 
reprovable and sanctions for dodging tax levies are often quite severe.          
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For  the  five  Mediterranean  countries  targeted  by  our  analyses, i.e., Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the 
evolution of RQ, GE, CC and RL over the period 2002-2012 is underlined in the subsequent figures. The indicators‟ annual 
values are represented by the percentile ranks among all countries, with 0 being the lowest rank and 100 the highest one.   
 
       Figure 5. Evolution  of Regulatory  Quality                    Figure 6. Evolution  of Government  Effectiveness 
                   Source: World Bank Data (2002-2012).                                    Source: World Bank Data (2002-2012). 
 
Overall, by comparing the countries‟ rankings displayed in figures 5 and 6, it can be noticed that the Mediterranean 
sample is slightly better off in terms of government effectiveness than regulatory quality. Conveying a decreasing level of 
trust  in  authorities,  the  lower  RQ  values  were triggered by severe economic downturns starting with year 2007, which 
called for the implementation of harsh austerity measures across all countries (e.g., increased fiscal pressure, especially via 
indirect  taxation;  mitigation  of  government  spending by decreasing or cutting social security benefits; substantial civil 
servant layoffs) and massive bailout requests to prevent country default. In this respect, Greece is the outlier, benefiting 
from  an  unparalleled  bailout  of  more than 200 billion Euros granted by the troika IMF-European Commission-European 
Central Bank during the period 2010-2012.           
Concerning GE, the analyzed countries score higher because authorities struggled to maintain the quality of public 
goods amid substantial cuttings imposed by crises and recession periods. These results are in line with other international 
rankings  which  assess  the  attributes  of public sector provisions. Hence, according to the 2013 “Quality of Life Index” 
developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit [30], among 80 worldwide nations, Italy ranks 21
st, Cyprus 23
rd, Spain 28
th, 
Portugal 30
th and Greece 34
th. In the same vein, Human Development Index 2012 places all the Mediterranean countries in 
the “very high human development” category among 186 analyzed, with Spain ranking 23
rd, Italy 25
th, Greece 29
th, Cyprus 
31
st and Portugal 43
rd [8].    
The outliers of the government effectiveness are Italy and Greece, whose governments are perceived as less reliable in 
implementing adequate strategies due to various clashes on the political arena, transient governing alliances and general 
instability amid civil protests.        
           Figure 7. Evolution  of Control for Corruption                         Figure 8. Evolution  of Rule of Law 
Source: World Bank Data (2002-2012).                                 Source: World Bank Data (2002-2012). 
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As stated before, power of authorities is considered to be negatively correlated with corruption and shadow economy, 
viz. authorities are perceived as feeble when taint public behavior and the informal sector grow unimpeded. With respect to 
the analyzed Mediterranean sample, figures 7 and 8 point out two groups regarding both corruption control and rule of law. 
The first group assembles Cyprus, Spain and Portugal, which register similar levels concerning authorities‟ capabilities of 
lessening corruption and enforcing state laws. The second group comprises Greece and Italy, where authorities score much 
lower on both indicators. The country grouping is mirrored also by the rankings provided through the 2012 Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index [27]. With scores of 66, 65 and 63 respectively, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal are 
perceived less corrupt (i.e., “cleaner”) than the countries from the second group (i.e., Italy: 42; Greece:  36).         
Overall, authorities are perceived to be less effective in catching and punishing tax defectors due to the size of their 
untaxed activities. Assessments of shadow economy levels (as percentage of GDP) rank them among the countries with the 
highest  tendencies  of  evading  taxes,  compared  to  other  EU  and  Euro-Zone  members:  Cyprus  25%,  Greece  24%, Italy 
21.6%,  Portugal  19.4%  and  Spain 19.2% (Schneider, 2012). With such realities in full sight, tax authorities from each of 
these countries have looked for appropriate solutions in boosting revenue collection. One thing worth noticing is that, in the 
attempt of fighting rampant tax evasion, most of them have used unconventional stick-based strategies perceived by part of 
the taxpayers as belonging to an antagonistic tax climate.    
Portuguese tax authorities have implemented a manifold of stick strategies to curtail noncompliance: 1) doubled the 
number of tax inspectors to deter mainly prosperous citizens and self-employed from going into the underground economy; 
2) introduced compulsory electronic invoicing system; 3) increased penalties by 50%. With respect to the last strategy, 
fines may range between 45,000 Euros (i.e., payable in cases of negligent noncompliance) and 165,000 Euros (i.e., payable 
for intentional noncompliance). Moreover, citizens evading less than 200,000 Euros in taxes could be incarcerated for five 
years and those exceeding 200,000 Euros could be detained for eight years, as opposed to former sanctions of three and five 
years, respectively. In an attempt to raise citizens‟ awareness on the importance of soliciting receipts and give compliance 
an impetus, Portuguese authorities have recently launched a weekly car lottery granting residents the possibility of  winning 
a vehicle upon registering purchase receipts [28]-[33].       
Since  2012,  Spanish  authorities  have  enacted  a special law prohibiting cash payments  above 2,500 Euros between 
business proprietors and independent contractors. The law providing sanctions for all parties involved of up to 25% of such 
cash transactions aims to clamp down on VAT tax evasion, which annually diminishes the state budget by 18 billion Euros  
[37]. 
Second group countries have also come up with own versions of tackling the corrosive effects of tax evasion. After 
unceasing media pillory for inadvertently misplacing the famous “Lagarde list” containing roughly names of 2,000 Greek 
tax  evaders,  authorities  in  Greece  have  decided  to  harshly  tackle  noncompliance.  Accordingly,  the  Greek  Ministry  of 
Development, Competitiveness and Infrastructure enacted a new regulation on January 12, 2013 which requires business 
owners to exhibit a sign informing customers they are fully entitled to leave without paying for a particular good/service if 
no receipt is issued by the seller. In the same vein, the Ministry of Finance has teamed up with the Hellenic Coast Guard, 
which will  use its vessels to ease the access of tax agents on Greek islands and mitigate tax evasion attempts [31]. 
Fully aware that tax evaders were frequently perceived in a rather positive light, as more intelligent and cunning than 
honest  taxpayers  (Berti  and  Kirchler,  2001; Burton, Karlinsky and Blanthorne, 2005; Kirchler, 1998) [2]-[3]-[13], Agenzia 
Delle  Entrate  (i.e.,  the  Italian  tax  authority)  initiated  in  2011  a  media  campaign  in  collaboration  with  the  famous  ad 
company  Saatchi  &  Saatchi,  hoping  to  begin  changing  the  mentality  of  ordinary  citizens.  Through  a  succinct  and 
illustrative TV spot, tax evaders were described as parasites dwelling at others expense and harming society as a whole. 
While reaching adults, Italian tax officers have also taught basic notions of fiscal responsibility to elementary and middle 
school children through a program covering over 1,200  schools [34]. 
Though the aforementioned strategies have yielded significant results across all Mediterranean countries in terms of 
collected revenue and financial predicaments improvement, much progress is still needed. The upcoming years will reveal 
the appropriate moment for tax authorities to change current enforcement strategies (i.e., “sticks”) with more lenient ones 
(“carrots”).   
    
4. Conclusions 
 
By means of different economic, financial and psychological variables, involving measures quantified by the World 
Bank  Group  (i.e.,  government  effectiveness,  regulatory  quality,  rule  of law, control for corruption)  for the period 2002-
2012, chain base indexes analyses concerning economic performance (computations entailing GDP per capita), quantitative 
evaluation  of  tax  compliance  process  (computations  entailing  Paying Taxes series), the present study renders the two 
principal  dimensions  of  the  “slippery  slope  framework”,  viz.  trust  in  authorities  and  power  of  authorities,  within  the 
Mediterranean tax climate spread across Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
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On the account that the 2008 world financial turmoil and the EMU sovereign-debt crisis have deepened the economic 
woes across Mediterranean tax climate states, citizens‟ perceptions concerning authorities capacity  of supplying quality 
public  goods  and  efficiently  fighting tax evasion have decreased substantially. With respect to the World Governance 
indicators  proxies  of  trust  and  power,  country  values  generally range between 50 and 90, as an expression of citizens 
discontent with governments‟ austerity measures. Staggering levels of corruption, shadow economy and tax evasion have 
determined  authorities  to  resolutely  convert  past  “carrot”  approaches  into  “sticks”  meant  to  ultimately  discipline  tax 
dodgers and raise tax compliance.      
Multidisciplinary  estimations  regarding  levels  of  trust  in  and  power  of  authorities  may  assist  policy  makers  in 
assessing  the  effectiveness  of  past  fiscal  strategies  (e.g.,  mitigation  of  direct  taxation, increase of indirect tax burden, 
enactment of severe punishments against tax dodgers) for raising overall tax compliance, mitigating detrimental effects of 
future economic downturns and even impede them.  
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